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Earnings management around initial public offering (IPO) is a noteworthy matter 
in the Chinese stock market. Underwriter and external auditor, as important external 
mechanisms to alleviate the information asymmetry between issuers and investors, are 
supposed to curb corporate financial window dressing around IPO. However, 
underwriter-auditor relationship (UA relationship) is becoming more and more 
significant recently. Underwriters display obvious preference on certain auditors, and 
the ratio of the cooperating services between the underwriter and a specific auditor to 
the total IPO services of the underwriter is abnormally high. There are two main 
possibilities related to the influence of underwriter-auditor relationship on IPO 
earnings management: On one hand, this relationship may result in conspiracy. In 
order to obtain abnormal economic benefits, the underwriters and auditors with close 
relationship urge to manipulate earnings upwards. On the other hand, the relationship 
may be a consequence of efficiently collaborations and deep trust relationships, by 
which the information asymmetry and transaction cost are lowered and thus IPO 
earnings management is reduced. 
With a theoretical analysis, I suggest that the increase in the frequency of 
cooperating services between underwriter and auditor leads to the increase in 
abnormal economic benefits form conspiracy as well as the raise of exposure risk. 
These effects, taken together, result in an inverted U relation between 
underwriter-auditor relationship and the expected abnormal benefits. Therefore, 
underwriter and auditor tend to collude when UA relationship is relatively low, and 
choose to collaborate when UA relationship is high. 
To empirically test my conjecture, I construct a sample of 1,368 firms that intend 
to go public covering the period form 2006 to 2012. The empirical results show an 
inverted-U relation between UA relationship and the average discretionary accruals 
before IPO. Specifically, when the proportion of cooperating services between 
underwriter and auditor is lower than the inflexion point, UA relationship significantly 
increases discretionary accruals; but when the proportion exceeds the inflexion point, 
UA relationship significantly decreases discretionary accruals. Moreover, I find that 














relationship and discretionary accruals. The tests using subsamples show that, the 
above results are mainly driven by the subsample of Non-SOEs, with low legal index, 
with firms that intend to go public on the Small and Medium Enterprises Board and 
Growth Enterprises Board, and with disreputable underwriters or/and auditors. 
Furthermore, I document a U relation between UA relationship and the change in 
financial performance after IPO. 
My research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, my 
study adds to the literature on IPO earnings management by investigating the 
influence of UA relationship on the average discretionary accruals before IPO. Second, 
my results indicate that auditors make a tradeoff between economic benefits and audit 
risk, which echo the argument that auditors balance benefits and losses in making 
audit decisions. Third, my study supports to the findings that industry specialist 
auditors improve corporate earnings quality. Finally, the results using subsamples 
considering the reputation of underwriters and auditors provide evidence on the 
effects of reputation mechanism on constraining earnings managements. 
 
 
Key words: Underwriter-Auditor Relationship; IPO Earnings Management; Industry 















目  录 
第 1 章 导言 ······································································ 1 
1.1 问题的提出 ············································································· 1 
1.2 研究内容及结构安排 ································································· 3 
1.3 研究的理论贡献 ······································································· 4 
第 2 章 相关文献回顾 ·························································· 6 
2.1 IPO 盈余管理行为 ····································································· 6 
2.1.1 IPO 盈余管理的动机 ····························································· 6 
2.1.2 IPO 盈余管理的影响因素 ······················································· 7 
2.1.3 IPO 盈余管理的经济后果 ····················································· 11 
2.2 IPO 业务中的券商与审计师关系 ················································· 13 
2.3 相关文献小结 ········································································ 15 
第 3 章 中国 IPO 市场中的券商-审计师绑定现象 ······················ 16 
3.1 中国新股发行制度的发展 ························································· 16 
3.2 券商在 IPO 业务中的动机 ························································ 19 
3.3 审计师在 IPO 业务中的动机 ····················································· 22 
3.4 IPO 市场中的券商-审计师绑定现象 ············································· 24 
第 4 章 券商-审计师绑定关系与 IPO 盈余管理 ························· 26 
4.1 券商、审计师的绑定关系决策模型 ············································· 26 
4.2 券商-审计师绑定关系与 IPO 盈余管理的倒 U 型关系 ······················ 28 
4.3 审计师行业专长对券商/审计师决策模型的作用 ····························· 32 
4.4 审计师行业专长对券商-审计师绑定关系与 IPO盈余管理的倒U型关系的
调节作用 ··················································································· 34 
第 5 章 实证检验 ······························································· 36 
5.1 模型和关键变量 ····································································· 36 
5.1.1 实证模型 ········································································· 36 














5.2 样本筛选和数据来源 ······························································· 40 
5.3 描述性统计和相关系数 ···························································· 41 
5.4 多元回归结果 ········································································ 42 
5.4.1 券商-审计师绑定关系和 IPO 盈余管理 ····································· 42 
5.4.2 券商-审计师绑定关系、审计师行业专长和 IPO 盈余管理 ············· 44 
5.5 本章图表 ·············································································· 46 
第 6 章 敏感性测试与内生性讨论 ·········································· 57 
6.1 因变量稳健测试 ····································································· 57 
6.2 自变量稳健测试 ····································································· 58 
6.3 进一步检验——采用联立方程控制内生性 ···································· 59 
6.4 进一步检验——分组检验 ························································· 61 
6.5 进一步检验——考虑券商和审计师的声誉效应 ······························ 63 
6.6 进一步检验——券商-审计师绑定关系与业绩变脸 ·························· 64 
6.7 进一步检验——采用保荐人与签字审计师个人层面的绑定关系...............67 
6.8 本章图表 ·············································································· 68 
第 7 章 结论 ····································································· 84 
7.1 研究结论 ·············································································· 84 
7.2 研究缺陷和未来研究方向 ························································· 85 















Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction························································ 1 
1.1 Research Problem ···································································· 1 
1.2 The Structure of Text ································································ 3 
1.3 Theoritical Contribution ··························································· 4 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ················································ 6 
2.1 IPO Earnings Management ························································ 6 
2.1.1 The Motivation of IPO Earnings Management ····························· 6 
2.1.2 The Influtiential Factors of IPO Earnings Management ··················· 7 
2.1.3 The Consequencies of IPO Earnings Management ······················ 11 
2.2 Underwriter-Auditor Relationship in IPO Business ························ 13 
2.3 Summary of Related Literature ················································· 15 
Chapter 3 Underwriter-Auditor Relationship in Chinese IPO Market 
 ···················································································· 16 
3.1 The Institution Background of Chinese New Share Issuing ··············· 16 
3.2 Underwriter's Motivation in IPO Business ··································· 19 
3.3 Auditor's Motivation in IPO Business ········································· 21 
3.4 The Bonding Relationship berween Underwriter and Auditor ··········· 23 
Chapter 4 Underwriter-Auditor Relationship & IPO Earings 
Management ···································································· 26 
4.1 The Decision Model for Underwriter-Auditor Relationship··············· 26 
4.2 The Inverse-U relation between Underwriter-Auditor Relationship and 
IPO Earnings Management ·························································· 28 
4.3 The influence of Auditor Industry Specializaiton on the Decison Model 32 
4.4 The Moderationg Effect of Auditor Industry Specialization on the 
Inverse-U Relation between Underwriter-Auditor Relationship and IPO 
Earnings Management ································································ 34 
Chapter 5 Empirical Tests ··················································· 36 
5.1 Empirical Models and the Measures of Key Variables ····················· 36 














5.1.2 The Measures of Key Variables ············································ 38 
5.2 Sample and Data ··································································· 40 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Matrix  ··················· 41 
5.4 Multivariate Tests ·································································· 42 
5.4.1 Underwriter-Auditor Relationship and IPO Earnings Management ··· 42 
5.4.2 Underwriter-Auditor Relationship, Auditor Industry Specialization and 
IPO Earnings Management ························································ 44 
5.5 Pitures and Tables in the Chapter ·············································· 46 
Chapter 6 Sensitive Tests and the Discussion of Endogeneity ········ 57 
6.1 Robustness Checks Using Ohter Measures of IPO Earnings Management
 ····························································································· 57 
6.2 Robustness Checks Using Ohter Measures of Underwriter-Auditor 
Relationship ············································································· 58 
6.3 Additional Test Considering Potential Endogeneity ························ 59 
6.4 Additional Test Using Various Subsamples ··································· 61 
6.5 Additional Test Considering the Reputation Effects ························ 63 
6.6 Additional Test of Underwriter-Auditor Relationship and Post-IPO 
Financial Performance ································································ 64 
6.7 Additional Test Using Sponsor-Signed Auditor Relationship....................67 
6.8 Pitures and Tables in the Chapter ·············································· 68 
Chapter 7 Conclusions ······················································· 84 
7.1 Summary of the Study ···························································· 84 
7.2 Limitation and Further Research Directions ································· 85 













第 1 章 导言 
 1
























                                                        
①根据理财周报的统计显示，众多的大型券商具有明显的偏好某一审计师的倾向，并且与特定审计师的合作
次数占该券商的 IPO 业务总量相当大的比例。例如，平安证券合作最频繁的会计师事务所为华普天健高商
会计师事务所，深圳鹏城会计师事务所承接了 2009 年至 2011 年之间国信证券保荐的 65 个 IPO 项目中的































系与 IPO 盈余管理之间呈现倒 U 型的二次方关系。 
为了研究券商-审计师绑定关系如何影响拟发行企业的盈余管理程度，本文
将构建一个绑定关系与 IPO 盈余管理的二次方模型并实证检验券商与审计师在




































与 IPO 盈余管理的呈倒 U 型关系的研究假设。并且，对审计师行业专长如何影响
券商和审计师绑定与 IPO 盈余管理的关系进行理论分析，提出关于审计师行业专长









 第三章中国 IPO 市场中的券商-审计师绑定现象 








































IPO 财务造假的经济利益与风险之间做出了权衡，回应了 Reynolds 和 Francis
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